There is an inconsistency in the ways that doctors make clinical decisions regarding the treatment of babies born extremely prematurely. Many experts now recommend that clinical decisions about the treatment of such babies be individualized and consider many different factors. Nevertheless, many policies and practices throughout Europe and North America still appear to base decisions on gestational age alone or on gestational age as the primary factor that determines whether doctors recommend or even offer life-sustaining neonatal intensive care treatment. These policies are well intentioned. They aim to guide doctors and parents to make decisions that are best for the baby. That is an ethically appropriate goal. But in relying so heavily on gestational age, such policies may actually do the babies a disservice by denying some babies treatment that might be beneficial and lead to intact survival. In this paper, we argue that such policies are unjust to premature babies and ought to be abolished. In their place, we propose individualized treatment decisions for premature babies. This would treat premature babies as we treat all other patients, with clinical decisions based on an individualized estimation of likelihood that treatment would be beneficial.
expensive and burdensome, and the consequences of being wrong can be tragic. Given these complexities, it is not surprising that doctors and policymakers have often proposed guidelines for making such decisions or that those guidelines rely heavily on the estimated gestational age (EGA) of the baby. Such guidelines reduce the complexity and allow decisions to be made quickly and without the uncertainty that would inevitably accompany a more individualized treatment approach. The problem with such guidelines is that a large body of evidence suggests that EGA alone is inadequate to accurately prognosticate the likely outcomes. Such EGA-focused policies reveal an inconsistency in the approach to preemies compared to other patients. In other high-risk clinical situations (e.g., patients with cancer, stroke, or major trauma), doctors are generally encouraged to consider all of the factors that make each 1 individual patient's situation unique. 3 For these other patients, the indications and contraindications for treatment are all considered relative, not absolute, and doctors, patients, and family members are expected to deal with the irreducible complexity. Doctors try to make an individualized assessment of the patient's prognosis and, if there is a reasonable chance of a good outcome, they recommend treatment. 4 If doctors think that the outcome will be bad, they discuss that with the patient or surrogate and may recommend palliative care only. 5 When there is a reasonable chance of a good outcome, they might try to guide surrogates toward one decision or another by either discouraging or encouraging treatment.
There are many factors that might alter the prognosis for a tiny premature baby. These factors include, among others, birth weight, gender, race, and whether antenatal steroids were given to the pregnant woman. These factors can dramatically alter a baby's chance of survival, so that, for example, a black female baby whose mother received steroids has a much higher likelihood of survival that a white male whose mother did not receive steroids, even at the same gestational age. 6 Nevertheless, in many centers, the 23-week girl with a better prognosis would be denied treatment that is provided to the 25-week boy who is likely to do worse.
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These modifying factors have led some professional societies to recommend individualized decisions that do not rely so heavily on EGA. But, as noted above, many policies continue to focus on EGA and there is evidence that many doctors in many centers do not individualize decisions for such babies. 8 This is an exceptional situation in clinical medicine. Generally speaking, when treatments are available that offer a 20-60% chance of survival, doctors are eager to offer such treatments. 9 But, for premature babies, oddly, some centers continue to not even offer treatment. 10 Not surprisingly, centers that do actively treat these babies report higher survival rates than in those centers where premature babies are not offered treatment.
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Janvier and colleagues have offered an explanation for this unique inconsistency in medical practice. They have shown that most people think about treatment decisions for preemies differently than they think about similar decisions for older patients. Moreover, they are less willing to provide medical care to extremely premature babies (EPBs) than to other patients, even when the baby has a better prognosis than the other patients. 12 This is true for both doctors and parents, both of whom seem to think of and treat the premature baby as a 'conditional person'. 13 These attitudes potentially undergird the EGA-focused policies that lead to non-treatment of many premature babies.
In this paper, we will suggest that non-treatment of babies who have a reasonable chance of intact survival is contrary to both medical norms and to most theories of justice. But before delving into these arguments, we begin with some facts about the realities of neonatal intensive care today regarding survival outcomes and practice variation.
Then, we will present the reader with six rationales behind EGA-based treatment policies and argue that these rationales do not withstand critical scrutiny. Neonatologists consider GA by weeks and days. When we (or treatment policies) discuss babies born at 24 weeks of gestation, this refers to babies born between 24 weeks and 0 days (24 0/7) and 24 weeks and 6 days (24 6/7). This article focuses on premature births at 22 0/7 weeks to 24 6/7 weeks of gestation. We refer to babies born at <25 weeks of gestation as EPBs.
14 Of note, although policies and clinical studies discuss gestational age as if it can be determined precisely, in most cases it cannot. GA is determined prenatally by two factors, the mother's recollection of her last menstrual period and an ultrasound examination of the fetus. The exception is in cases of in vitro fertilization, in which the day of conception is known precisely. Consequently, unless a women and/or family have opted for assisted reproductive technology, GA cannot be known with certainty. Prenatal assessment of GA (by last menstruation period, clinical assessment, and/or ultrasound) can be wrong by as much as a week or two in either direction. 15 After the baby is born, doctors estimate GA by certain features of the physical examination. These, too, have a margin of error of a week or two. 16 Thus, when we say that a baby is born at, say, 23 weeks, we really mean that the baby is somewhere between 21 and 25 weeks of GA. Hence, most discussions accurately use the term 'estimated gestational age'.
Additionally, current outcomes are determined by the conjunction of two major factors: by (a) the efficacy of treatment itself; and (b) the policies that permit or prohibit treatment of particular groups of babies.
These two points will be discussed in the following paragraphs. practices (e.g., induction and cesarean section) but these are often not reported. 22 We also need more detailed data than is often provided about the exact cause of babies' deaths. Often studies do not distinguish between, for example, a baby dying with a parenchymal hemorrhage for whom life-support was withdrawn and a baby dying because of a parenchymal hemorrhage. 23 The former might be an elective withdrawal of treatment based on considerations of quality of life, while the latter might reflect the futility of attempted treatment. Some studies do not differentiate between birth outcomes after active treatment and withholding treatment. 24 This can be misleading when used to infer the probability of a good outcome for 22-weekers in which treatment is intended. Studies show outcome results that are the average survival rates of all babies among centers with different philosophies.
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But this is as irrelevant as reporting the survival rates from cancer which includes patients who chose chemotherapy as well as patients who chose to forego life-sustaining treatment.
To address these inconsistencies, a group of scholars have recently proposed standards for outcome studies in neonatology that would include data on decisions regarding treatment. They state that results on survival can only be interpreted accurately if we know the frequency of decisions to provide or withhold life-sustaining treatment since these decisions powerfully influence reported survival statistics. 26 Until such reporting practices are followed, published studies must be interpreted with caution born of knowledge of large variations in practices.
| Evidence of practice variation
There is clear evidence of practice variation among different centers in both Europe and North America.
In Europe, there is little consensus regarding the treatment of babies less than 25 weeks EGA. In Germany, most babies born at 22
and 23 weeks receive active treatment. German centers report higher rates of survival at these gestational ages than most other countries.
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Reports from some NICUs in Sweden show high survival rates for babies born at 23 weeks who received active interventions. 28 Other
Swedish centers are less likely to treat babies born at this gestational age and have lower survival rates. are driven more by EGA-based policies than by individualized decisions.
There is wide variation regarding the gestational age at which it is con- The promulgation and use of policies that rely primarily on gestational age seems to be unscientific, inexplicable, and unjust. Why, then, do such policies persist? We now delve into the six rationales for EGA-focused policies.
| RA TI ON A LE S F OR T RE A TM EN T POL I CI E S BA S ED ON E GA
The continued use of policies to allocate treatment based on EGA is 
| The burden of treatment
One of the distinctive features of intensive care for extremely premature infants is that the burden of treatment is substantial. 37 In general, Although the burden of treatment can outweigh the overall benefits of treatment, this is not the case for every EPB born <25 weeks gestation. Instead, physicians' ought to disclose these burdens to parents and engage them in shared decision-making, rather than following a 'one-size-fits-all' policy.
| EGA as a predictor of long-term neurocognitive impairment
It is well known that extreme prematurity is associated with brain dam- Although it is also well known that babies at 22 and 23 weeks have much lower rates of survival than babies born at 24 or 25 weeks, this, too, may not be the most important consideration. If many babies born at 23 weeks die, but most of the survivors are neurocognitively intact, then treatment might be medically indicated and ethically justifiable. Tiny babies would be analogous to adults with some cancers for whom treatment is unlikely to be successful but, if successful, would lead to long-term intact survival. In the adult situation, treatment would likely be offered. 41 As we have seen, for preemies, it is often not. 
| The continuum between prenatal and postnatal decisions
A third consideration that buttresses policies based on EGA has to do with the continuum between fetal life and extra-uterine life. 47 In order to achieve the best survival rates for preemies, some interventions must be given to the pregnant woman who goes into labor early. Preemies do better, for example, if their mothers are given steroids to hasten the development of the fetal lungs. And in some cases, a C-section may be medically indicated. 48 But the decision about whether to use steroids or how to deliver is up the woman herself. At that point, she is the only 'legal' patient, even though her choice will have a profound effect on the unborn child's chances for survival.
This continuum of care can be used to argue that, because pregnant women have the right to make decisions about their own treatment during pregnancy, even decisions that will have an impact on the unborn child's chance for survival, they should also have the right to make decisions postnatally about life-sustaining treatments for their child. We believe that the continuum between prenatal and postnatal decisions has different ethical implications.
Pregnant woman, like all competent adults, have the right to make medical treatment decisions for themselves. Hence, a pregnant woman's decisions about steroid use, fetal monitoring, a caesarian section, or the timing of delivery must be respected. To do otherwise would violate women's basic rights to personal autonomy and bodily integrity. 49 As the ACOG's opinion shows, the obstetrician may have divided loyalties, but his or her primary loyalty must be with the pregnant patient rather than with the fetus.
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Loyalty to the pregnant woman, however, does not mean that the obstetrician or neonatologist should act paternalistically on her behalf. resulting in a worse prognosis for her unborn. 51 By the same token, she has the right to choose treatment that would result in a better prognosis for her unborn. But that option is only a realistic one if treatment would be offered.
We suspect that the full range of choices is often not offered to pregnant women who go into labor at 22 and 23 weeks. 52 This would likely be true at centers that do not offer active treatment at these gestational ages. After all, it would make no sense to intervene prenatally if no postnatal interventions were to be offered.
The result of these considerations is that it is possible for women in the same high-risk pregnancy to have two opposing prenatal discussions based on the hospital's or country's EGA-focused policy rather than on the prognosis. For example, consider a pregnant woman who is in labor at 23 weeks of gestation. In some countries or centers, she would be told that, if her unborn child is born at 23 weeks, it would not receive life-sustaining treatment. So, it would be unreasonable for her to choose antenatal steroids. But if that same woman is in another center, doctors might recommend antenatal steroids. They might also inform the woman that the prognosis will be better if she consents to treatment. In such circumstances, many women might choose treatments for themselves that have, as their goal, a better outcome for their unborn child.
We believe that pregnant women at risk for premature birth should receive individualized antenatal counseling and that decisions should be made based on the woman's goals and preferences. 
| The human rights of the newborn
The balance of rights changes once the baby is born alive. At that point, the baby has rights that are independent of the mother's rights. At the moment of birth, a baby can now be cared for as an individual without negating the rights of a pregnant woman. Then, the autonomous rights of the mother should no longer supersede the rights of the newborn. 54 Human rights are inalienable fundamental rights of people on the basis of their humanity regardless of their nationality, place of residence, sex, color, religion, language, or any other status. 55 They are rights to which a person is inherently entitled simply because she or he is a human being.
Some argue, however, that a newborn does not have the same rights as other individuals and they do not have equal moral status. 56 To date, there is no consensus in the philosophical literature on when a human being acquires 'personhood' and has equal moral status as other individuals who are entitled to human rights. If preemies are considered to have 'personhood', hence entitled to human rights and corresponding moral status, then treatment decisions for prematurely newborn babies should recognize their rights and moral status independently from the mother or the family. Instead, for many scholars, personhood is contingent upon adequate cognition. The basis for these arguments is that babies do not have key cognitive capacities such as sentience and self-awareness. 57 By these arguments, we should treat tiny preemies (and all newborns) as conditional persons who do not yet have a justifiable moral claim to equal treatment. They would acquire personhood, and thus, rights, at some later date only if they develop the appropriate cognitive capacities.
This position conflicts with the universal human rights framework that is embodied in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
The CRC recognizes that moral status begins at birth. The convention makes no distinctions between premature babies, term babies, and older children. In addition, Article 6 Sections 1 and 2 state that children's inherent right to life should be recognized to the maximum extent possible, while Article 24 makes clear that the child's interests should be of primary concern. 58 We agree with the human rights framework of the CRC. The moment of birth is the moment at which the newborn becomes an individual and a member of the social and political community with full legal rights. Any other approach would require a deeply problematic attempt to draw bright lines across the continuum of human development and human capabilities. 59 Ultimately, it would lead to the dehumanization of large segments of the population who may lack some threshold of cognitive capacity, including, not just preemies but, perhaps, children with neurocognitive impairments and adults with dementia. 60 However, this logical implication is rarely drawn and older 51 adults with cognitive impairment, unlike EPBs, are often attributed moral status in spite of their cognitive condition. 
| The relative burden of death
Another plausible explanation for EGA-focused policies is the relative burden of death. This account holds that the interest of an EPB (and perhaps to a lesser extent a term baby) in his or her future might be less than that of an older child. According to the intuition of many people, the death of a 2-year old is worse than the death of a newborn. It may be that this intuition underlies an evaluation of best interests, which yields different answers for extreme premature babies. The benefits and harms of providing versus withholding treatment for an EPB or baby born at term are evaluated differently, yielding a different outcome threshold for decisions than in older patients. 62 We grant that theoretically people might have this intuition. They value a 1-day-old term newborn less than a 2-year-old, and they would value a preemie less than a term baby. At least in the sense that they would view a death not quite as bad. But this theoretical intuition can be contrasted with the way people actually behave.
When given the choice, most mothers and their partners choose to initiate care for their baby. 63 This means that while there might be this shared moral intuition that death is less bad, it does not mean it is not bad. It also does not mean that when given a choice most people would seek to avoid it, so that making an EGA policy based on that intuition protects and helps parents. Instead, one must ask whether, from the parents' perspective, it is better to try to save a tiny baby, even if the effort is unsuccessful, than it is to not try at all. That is exactly the sort of value question that properly ought to be answered by parents rather than by doctors or policy makers.
Some parents might prefer comfort care and a peaceful death, while others may want to give their baby a chance. In such situations, the best approach would be a trial of therapy. The trial of therapy might be unsuccessful, in which case the baby would die. If successful, however, the baby might have good long-term outcomes. Many studies suggest that parents are more likely than doctors or nurses to prefer the trial of therapy. 
| The cost of neonatal intensive care
A final consideration that supports EGA-focused policies are based on the fact that the care of each tiny baby is very expensive. Saving a baby born at 24 weeks costs hundred thousands of dollars. 65 The high cost of treatment is sometimes used to justify policies to limit the provision of intensive care treatment. 66 In addition, preemies have higher lifetime care costs than do other children because they are more likely to have chronic medical problems as well as neurocognitive or developmental problems. The combination of short-term and long-term costs, for both parents and society, has been invoked as valid justifications for policies that limit life-sustaining treatment. 67 There are good ethical reasons to consider the cost of treatment in making policies about what treatments to provide. After all, it would be both unfair and unwise to provide extraordinarily expensive treatments to one group of patients if the costs of those treatments are collectively subsidized and the outcomes are not good. Ultimately, this would lead to fewer resources available for beneficial treatments for other patients. 68 But there are three problems with these economic arguments as they are used in the context of EPBs. The first is that, like so many arguments about preemies, they are applied selectively. Many other patient groups, including people with cancer, bad heart disease, or strokes require expensive treatments that sometimes result in lifelong chronic conditions. Like preemies, patients with these conditions have a wide variety of outcomes. 69 But, in these settings, the possibility of a bad outcome is used to discuss risks and benefits with patients or surrogates, not to make policies about when or whether treatment should be offered. 70 Of note, even in European public health settings, where decisions are made about the costs of certain treatments and the price worth paying for health interventions, costs are not cited to deny all treatments or intensive care to broad groups of patients. Such discussions rather focus on specific treatment costs and pharmaceutical drugs.
The second problem with these sorts of arguments is that they would require an objective threshold of both costs and benefits that could be applied to a wide variety of patient groups in order to decide when or whether treatment should be offered. But it is difficult to develop an objective measure that will help determine whether a life is so miserable or so costly as to be not worth living. costs, most babies who survive do not have special health needs. After age 1, the medical care costs for premature babies are similar to the costs for babies born at term. 76 Second, most babies who die tend to die relatively quickly. Those who survive are often in the NICU for months. 77 Thus, most expenses in the NICU are directed to babies who will ultimately survive and do well. 78 In this regard, NICU care is more cost-effective than intensive care for adults, where most expenditures go to the care of patients who will either die in the hospital or die within a year of discharge. 79 In adult ICUs the best outcomes are among the patients with the shortest stays. The longer a patient is in the ICU, the higher their mortality rate. Most expenses in adult ICUs are thus directed toward patients who have the worst outcomes. As a result, they are far less cost-effective than NICUs. Put in another way, the most expensive NICU patients are much more cost-effective than the most expensive ICU patients. 80 To be clear, we believe that cost-effectiveness analysis can and should be considered in developing just policies to allocate health resources. But, to be just, these policies should treat all patients equally in the sense that they should apply similar cost-effectiveness criteria across the entire population.
Differential treatment based on cost-effectiveness could be ethically justified as an appropriate allocation of resources. Prioritization of limited life-saving resources is not discriminatory or unjust when the choice to forego treatment for an infant is based on ethically relevant and consistent considerations. 81 But such a utilitarian argument is not consistent if it is applied only to preemies. A justification for nontreatment of these babies that is not accompanied by a comparison of the utility of such treatment with the utility of, say, the treatment of 80 year olds, is not true to its own first premises.
| SU M M A RY A ND C ONCL U SI ON S
We have argued that policies that limit life-sustaining treatment based on the estimated gestation of an EPB are neither medically sound nor just.
They violate egalitarian principles because they do not provide equal access and fair chance to all individuals with a similar prognosis. 82 Additionally, a Rawlsian model of justice would only permit differential allocation of resources as long as that allocation preferentially favored the most vulnerable citizens. Such an approach might dictate that preemies be given preferential access to treatment, rather than face programmatic barriers to treatment. The health burdens of premature babies can be understood as an arbitrary effect of a natural lottery and bad luck. A just health care system should mitigate the unpredictability of nature through social institutions that assure equal opportunities 72 health care system would not allow resources to be allocated preferentially to able-bodied people compared to disabled people. If anything, the opposite should occur, in order to equalize the capabilities of both groups. 84 We assert that newborns, even those born prematurely, are fullfledged members of the human community and have the same right to treatment as other humans. This entails giving extreme preterm babies the best possible chance to life. Policies and practices that limit treatment based on gestational age alone violate this basic principle of justice.
Taken together, these arguments lead to a clear conclusion.
Policies that limit treatment based on EGA for babies who could survive with treatment violate important principles of justice. Instead, parents, doctors, and health systems should insure that each patient, even if the patient is a tiny preemie, be assessed as an individual.
Treatment should be provided if, after such an assessment, it is likely that the treatment will be beneficial for that individual. The criteria for deciding whether a treatment is likely to be beneficial should be the same for EPBs as they are for other individuals.
The criteria for limiting treatment in preemies, as in any patient group, should include a combination of (a) poor prognosis for survival, (b) likelihood of unacceptable disabilities, (c) burdens of treatment, (d)
costs and cost-effectiveness, and (e) informed consent and shared decision-making with parents. A just system would apply those criteria to all patient groups. Our current approach of denying treatment to some premature babies when it is provided in situations where it is less cost-effective to patients with a worse prognosis is unjust.
This might be perceived as a radical change. But it should not be.
After all, there are no national policies regarding other patient groups.
We do not limit treatment of the elderly based on age alone, or of cancer patients based only on the staging of their tumor. Our proposed approach simply recognizes that gestational age is a less powerful predictor than some believe it to be and that premature babies are more like other patients than they are sometimes seen to be. These policies, present in European but also in North American NICUs, could be an expression of a culture that systematically denies care for babies of certain gestational ages. It is important to call out policy-makers for their responsibility in rejecting EGA-focused policies. Changing policies is but one step in a long process of cultural change. Consequently, it is necessary to continue to address and discuss the limits of EGA within the neonatal community to foster a cultural change in the way physicians treat babies born extremely premature.
We are not suggesting that all premature babies should be treated.
We are making a more modest recommendation. We believe that all premature babies should have access to diagnostic and therapeutic regimens that are comparable to those that are available to other patients with life-threatening illnesses. There will be situations in which, after a thorough assessment, doctors and parents decide that the potential burdens of treatment outweigh the potential benefits. There will be situations where treatment is deemed futile. There are many situations in which a choice for palliative care rather than intensive care is appropriate and ethically justifiable. But we do not believe that this is true for all babies born at the borderline of viability, and it is especially not true for babies born at an EGA of >22 weeks. With regard to such babies, treatment decisions should be made after an individualized assessment of prognosis for survival and considerations of likely impairments. Such an individualized approach recognizes that simple rules are unlikely to solve complex problems. 85 
